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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“ORANGE BOOK” LISTING OF PATENTS UNDER THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT

JACOB S. WHARTON*
[L]aw is order, good law is good order.1

A corollary to Aristotle’s statement is that bad law is bad order, or, in other
words, disorder. When Congress enacts new laws, that body indubitably hopes
that such laws will further the goals we, as a society, find desirable and also
further the added purpose of avoiding disorder. Occasionally, a statutory
scheme is established that leads to an inequitable or undesirable result. Society
commonly associates these results as “loop holes” in the laws, or shortcomings
that lead to inadvertent and inequitable situations. Society’s observations, as is
often the case, are right.
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the
Hatch-Waxman Act” or “the Act”).2 The amendments altered the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act3 (“FFDCA” or “FDCA”) and the patent laws4
by creating a statutory scheme that sought to strike a balance between “two
conflicting policy objectives: to induce brand name pharmaceutical firms to
make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products,
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market.”5 These amendments have, in part, led to both public
benefit and detriment. This article investigates certain litigation involving the
Act, evaluates the current statutory and regulatory constructs, including the

* Mr. Wharton is an associate with the law firm of Harness, Dickey & Pierce, P.L.C. His practice
focuses on intellectual property litigation.
Please direct comments or questions to
jwharton@hdp.com.
1. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 162 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge University Press
1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc (2000), and 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 (2000).
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–376 (2000).
5. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting on
other grounds). A generic drug contains the same active ingredients as its brand-name
counterpart, but does not necessarily contain the same inactive ingredients. Mova Pharm. Corp.
v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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government’s own opinions, and, in particular, traces the entangled history of
one drug, Neurontin®, through both the courts and the media.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
The modern profusion of . . . governmental authorities offers almost limitless
possibilities for abuse.6

The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a complex set of rules with the
stated purpose to “make available more low cost generic drugs.”7 The
amendments brought about by the Act “were designed to simplify and expedite
the process by which the generic drugs are brought to market.”8 In passing the
Act, Congress was motivated by the concern that the Food and Drug
Administration’s (“the FDA”) lengthy drug approval process was a burden for
both the generic manufacturers and the rights and investments of the branded
drug manufacturers.9 This section provides the general framework necessary
to fully appreciate the impact of certain judicial decisions discussed herein.
This is, unfortunately, a complicated statute; it is described by one court as
“cumbersome”10 and by another as “very confusing and ambiguous.”11
Despite this, or rather because of this, it is worthwhile to investigate the statute
and review whether the above-stated goals are being realized, and to what
degree. It is also valuable so that the branded drug manufacturer and generic
drug manufacturer can clearly discern their rights and avoid needless litigation.
Before the enactment of the Act, both branded12 and generic13 drug
manufacturers wishing to bring a drug to market were required to file a New

6. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347 (1978).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
8. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2002).
9. The Amendments have been criticized for, inter alia, taking a “split-the-baby” approach
in an attempt to reach its stated goals. See Watson Pharms., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442,
444 (D. Md. 2001).
10. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997).
11. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Sullivan, No. 89-6-C(K), slip
op. at 7 (N.D.W.Va. May 5, 1989)).
12. The term “branded” drug manufacturer refers to those drug manufacturers holding the
patent rights to a particular FDA approved drug. The terms “pioneer” and “brand name”
manufacturer are used by the courts and various government agencies quoted herein. For
purposes of this writing, the terms are used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated.
13. The term “generic” drug manufacturer refers to those drug manufacturers producing
drugs having the same active ingredient or ingredients, often in the same formulation, as those
found in the products of “branded” drug manufacturers. Generic drugs are often sold at prices
considerably lower than branded drugs. See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, How Increased
Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical
Industry (July 1998) (hereinafter “CBO Study”), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=1 (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
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Drug Application, or “NDA.”14 This requirement presented a considerable
barrier to generic drug manufacturers because an NDA requires a full battery
of safety and efficacy tests, including expensive clinical trials.15 To further
impede a generic manufacturer’s entry into the market, and before the Act, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals16 interpreted the patent laws in a manner such
that a generic manufacturer was liable for infringement for research and
clinical trials until patents claiming the branded drugs had expired.17 This
interpretation of the statute resulted in the branded drug manufacturer having a
de facto extension of its patent monopoly because a generic manufacturer
would not only have to begin research and production after the patent’s
technical expiration, but would have to complete the NDA process as well.
In order to benefit consumers, the Act altered this requirement by allowing
a generic drug manufacturer to “piggyback on the original NDA filed by the
manufacturer of the brand-name drug.”18 This streamlined process allows a
drug manufacturer, generic or branded, to submit an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (“ANDA”).19 The ANDA process allows a drug manufacturer to
rely on the clinical studies performed by the New Drug Applicant and to
forego the safety and effectiveness testing of its new generic drug. The ANDA
applicant must prove only that its drug is a “bioequivalent” to the pioneer drug
approved in the NDA.20 This process allows generic manufacturers “to avoid

14. The term “NDA,” as used herein, may refer to a “New Drug Application” or a “New
Drug Applicant.” Its use will be apparent from the context.
15. See Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063.
16. The Federal Court of Appeals was created in 1982 by act of Congress. See Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. Congress conferred exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over most cases involving patent issues, including: (1) decisions by the
Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office; (2) decisions by District Courts in
infringement and other patent suits; (3) decisions by the United States Court of Federal Claims
(including reasonable compensation suits against the United States for use of a patented
invention); and (4) determinations of the United States International Trade Commission. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(4)(A), 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(3) and 1295(a)(6) (2000) respectively.
17. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (holding that the plain language of § 271(a) made the manufacture and testing (a use) of a
patented product before the expiration of the patent an act of infringement unless licensed, even if
that manufacture or use was solely for the purpose of conducting tests and developing the
necessary information to apply for regulatory approval later on). See also Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (recounting history of the HatchWaxman Act). For further analysis of Section 271 of Title 35, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (“No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform §
271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.”).
18. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2002).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).
20. See id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). See also Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 676 (“The ANDA applicant
can substitute bioequivalence data for the extensive animal and human studies of safety and
effectiveness that must accompany a full new drug application.”).
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the costly and time-consuming process associated with NDAs, thus facilitating
the approval and dissemination of low-costs generic drugs.”21 The Act
amended the patent laws so that a generic drug manufacturer no longer
infringes a patent covering an approved drug by performing those acts
necessary to prepare and file an ANDA.22 The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that, by purchasing bioequivalents of brand name drugs, consumers
saved $8-10 billion on retail purchases of prescription drugs in 1994 alone.23
Generic drugs now comprise more than 47 percent of the prescriptions filled
for pharmaceutical products.24 This is up from 19 percent in 1984 when the
Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted.25
To compensate pioneer drug manufacturers that invest heavily in the
clinical trials necessary for the NDA, the Hatch-Waxman Act also amended
the patent laws “to protect patent holders whose rights could be threatened by
the marketing of generic versions of their patented innovations.”26 To this end,
the amendments establish a mechanism for the listing of patents impacted by a
generic manufacturer attempting to enter the market through the filing of an
ANDA. Each drug company filing an NDA must submit, as part of its
application, a list of all the patents that:
[C]laim[] the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which
claim[] a method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of
patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by
the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.27

The FDA, through regulation, has defined the three types of patents that may
be submitted with an NDA: (1) drug substance (active ingredient patents)
patents; (2) drug product (formulation and composition) patents; and (3)
method of use patents.28 When the FDA approves an NDA, the patent
information submitted therewith is published in a publication entitled
“Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence,” known in agency
parlance as the “Orange Book.”29 An NDA applicant must list any new patents
21. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984)).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). See also aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227,
231 (4th Cir. 2002).
23. CBO Study, supra note 13.
24. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, Federal Trade
Commission, July 2002, at p. i. (hereinafter “the FTC Study”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
25. Id.
26. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (citing Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d
579, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
28. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002).
29. See Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Terry G.
Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting
Process, 54 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 245, 249-50 (1999).
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that issue during the pendency of the NDA application that claims the drug at
issue.30 Further, an NDA applicant also must amend its patent listing to
include information about any newly issued patents that claim the drug at issue
within thirty days of their issuance if they want to later invoke the statutory
mechanisms for excluding generic manufacturers (the 30-month stay,
discussed in detail supra).31 To further complicate matters, because an
applicant may not receive original approval for all aspects of the drug as
described in the original NDA submission, the applicant must amend the patent
submission to list only the patents that meet the listing criteria for the approved
drug product.32 Orange Book listings play an important role in effectuating the
dual goals articulated by Congress.
There are four important points to make about Orange Book listings: (1)
ANDA applicants are required to make certifications with respect to patents
listed in the Orange Book; (2) the NDA holder can use the listed patents to
invoke a temporary stay against approval of any ANDAs; (3) the FDA
mandates that method of use patents can be listed and remain in the book only
if such patents actually claim a use that has been approved by the agency; and
(4) the FDA has consistently taken the position that it does not, and will not,
police the listings for accuracy. Neither of these positions are statutory
directives; rather, they are imposed through FDA regulations.33
These first two points are discussed in more detail below. With respect to
the third, the listing of use patents, the FDA’s obvious goal is to restrict those
patents listed to patents that actually claim an approved use of the drug. For
example, if the drug was aspirin,34 and its approved use was to treat headaches,
a patent claiming the use of aspirin to treat high blood pressure should not be
listed. If, at some later time, aspirin is approved for the treatment of high
blood pressure, then the patent may be listed. The FDA takes the position that
it is the NDA’s obligation to verify the propriety of the use patents in the
Orange Book.35

30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
31. Id. at § 355(b)(2)(B).
32. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(ii) (2002).
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed.
Reg. 28,872, 28,908 (July 10, 1989) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, & 320
(“[I]nformation will be published in the list only on patents that . . . claim approved indications or
other conditions of use.”); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity
Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,345 (Oct. 3, 1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
34. Aspirin is good example of a trademark “gone generic.” Aspirin, at one time, was the
trade name for salicylic acid, the active ingredient in what we now call aspirin.
35. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions,
59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,345.
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That brings the fourth point squarely into focus—the FDA does not assume
any responsibility for verifying the patent submissions of an ANDA.36 The
agency views its role as purely ministerial.37 The agency bases this position on
the premise that they do not have the resources or the expertise to determine
the validity or scope of patent claims.38 The FDA’s practice is simply to list
the patent information it receives from brand manufacturers with the
expectation that those parties will understand and abide by the statutory and
regulatory mandates.39
In formulating the applicable regulations, the FDA explicitly declined to
establish a “mechanism for review of submitted patent information to
determine, at least on a very general basis, applicability to the particular NDA
in question.”40 The duty to verify the correctness of Orange Book listings, at
least under the current law, soundly resides with NDA holders.41 The statute
does not mandate the FDA to take any other position. It is, however, the
FDA’s position that allows manufacturers to “game” the system, which is
discussed further in Section II.
The ANDA applicant, when seeking approval for a generic drug, must
specify information about the patents listed by the branded drug manufacturer
in the Orange Book. The information must include:
[T]he patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the
drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a
method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.42

There are two means by which an ANDA can satisfy this requirement.43
In the first instance, when the Orange Book-listed patent “claims the listed
[i.e., FDA-approved] drug . . . or which claims a use for such listed drug for
36. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In short, the FDA’s
position is that if the NDA holder stands on it Orange Book listing, aggrieved parties are out of
luck.”). See also, Mahn, supra note 29, at 250 (noting the FDA’s “willingness to list in the
Orange Book virtually any patent submitted by an NDA holder”).
37. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002).
38. Id.
39. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions,
59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,345.
40. Id. at 50,343; see aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 243 (upholding the FDA’s “purely ministerial
approach to the Orange Book listing process” as a reasonable interpretation of its statutory
responsibilities).
41. See Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445-46 (D. Md. 2001) (“In
making its decision to list a patent . . . it is entirely appropriate and reasonable for the FDA to rely
on the patentee’s declaration as to coverage, and to let the patent infringement issues play out in
other, proper arenas, as is the clear intent of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.”).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
43. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
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which the applicant is seeking approval,” an ANDA applicant must certify that
the new drug, i.e., the generic drug, will not infringe the patent and explain that
conclusion.44 The statute provides four grounds on which this certification can
be made: (1) that the required patent information has not been filed; (2) that the
patent has expired; (3) that the patent will expire on a certain date; or (4) that
the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the drug for which approval is
sought.45 An ANDA applicant must also make additional certifications with
respect to any newly listed patents during its application process, so long as the
NDA holder submits the patent for listing no later than thirty days after the
patent’s issuance.46 The certification date determines the date on which FDA
approval of the application can become effective.47 The ANDA must submit
information for all patents listed in the Orange Book “despite any disagreement
as to the correctness of the patent information.”48
An ANDA making a paragraph (I) or paragraph (II) certification may be
approved immediately if the FDA finds that all the relevant scientific and
regulatory requirements have been met.49 An application making a paragraph
(III) certification becomes effective on the date the patent or patents at issue
expire, assuming the other FDA requirements are met.50 Certifications made
under paragraphs (I-III), therefore, do not implicate patent infringement
because the generic manufacturer’s product will not come to market until any
relevant patents have expired. It is this last option, the so-called “Paragraph
(IV) certification,” however, that gives rise to most litigation involving
ANDAs.
The Paragraph (IV) certification is frequently litigated because of the
rights created in both an ANDA and the NDA when such certification is made.
An ANDA applicant making a paragraph (IV) certification must give notice of
the filing both to the owner of the patent and to the holder of the NDA for the
approved drug (often, but not always, the same party).51 The applicant must
also include a detailed statement providing the factual and legal basis of the
applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or will not be infringed.52 The
Hatch-Waxman Act provides that the act of filing a paragraph (IV)
certification with respect to a patent creates a cause of action for patent

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
Id. at (I)-(IV).
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(vi) (2002).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2000).
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1034

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1027

infringement in the patent holder.53 The patent holder, once it receives notice
of the paragraph (IV) certification, has forty-five days in which to file a suit for
patent infringement. The patent holder is motivated to bring suit because the
FDA will approve, unless such suit is brought, the ANDA’s application.54 If
an infringement suit is initiated, the FDA’s approval of the ANDA is
automatically stayed for 30 months (“the 30-month stay”).55 Precisely
speaking, the stay continues until the earliest of: (1) the expiration of the
patent; (2) judicial resolution of the patent infringement suit, or (3) thirty
months from the patent holder’s receipt of notice.56 In addition, the period of
the stay can be lengthened or shortened by the court hearing the infringement
action if either party fails to “reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”57
These provisions allow the patent holder to defend their intellectual property
rights before the FDA approves a generic version of a drug.58 Thus, the listing
of a patent in the Orange Book is important for the fact that the patent holder
can potentially rely on the 30-month stay. In the alternative, “[i]f a patent is
not listed in the Orange Book, ANDA applicants do not have to file a
paragraph (IV) certification, and the patent holder is unable to take advantage
of the thirty-month stay.”59 Thus, a patent holder would have to wait until a
generic sought out and received ANDA approval and began marketing its drug
product before bringing suit. The implications of the 30-month stay are of
great economic import to a drug company and, as discussed below, the listing
of patents in the Orange Book has become the issue in more than one lawsuit.
Facing a patent infringement suit and a 30-month stay on its ANDA, a
generic manufacturer may not wish to risk liability in an infringement suit.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, however, provides an incentive to generic
manufacturers willing to risk defending a patent infringement suit. The first
generic manufacturer to gain approval of an ANDA containing a paragraph
(IV) certification is entitled to a 180-day period of market exclusivity.60
During this 180-day period, described by one court as an “edenic moment of
freedom from the pressures of the marketplace,”61 the FDA will not approve
applications subsequently filed by other manufacturers. This effectively
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . [an
ANDA] . . . if the purpose of such submission is to obtain [FDA] approval . . . to engage in the
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent . . . before the expiration of
such patent.”).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 802 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
58. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 232 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Labs., Inc., 69
F.3d 1130, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
59. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 232.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
61. Mova v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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allows the generic drug manufacturer to move its drug to market before the
other generic manufacturers.62 From 1992 until 1998, the FDA did not grant
the 180-day market exclusivity to any applicants. Since 1998, however, and as
a result of a court ruling changing the FDA’s regulations, the FDA has granted
the 180-day market exclusivity for thirty-one drug products.63
As mentioned above, there is an alternative to a paragraph (IV)
certification. This alternative is commonly known as a “section (viii)
statement.”64 This section applies when the patent in question is a “method of
use of patent which does not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking
approval under this subsection.”65 An applicant is directed, by FDA
regulation, to use a section (viii) statement when “the labeling for the drug
product for which the applicant is seeking approval does not include any
indications that are covered by the use patent” that was submitted by the
NDA.66 When an applicant files a section (viii) statement, no certification is
needed under paragraphs I-IV; rather, the ANDA applicant must submit a
statement that the method of use patent at issue does not claim the use of the
drug for which the applicant is seeking approval.67 The significant difference
between a paragraph (IV) certification and a section (viii) statement is that an
ANDA applicant making a section (viii) statement does not have to notify the
patent owner of its ANDA nor is the ANDA applicant liable to a patent
infringement action.68 Furthermore, should the patent holder decide to bring
an infringement action, the 30-month stay could not be invoked. The FDA,
therefore, can immediately approve an ANDA containing a section (viii)
statement. This provision obviously provides an attractive route for ANDA
applicants, even though it does not provide for a 180-day market exclusivity
period. As discussed below, the availability of a section (viii) statement turns
on whether the method of use patent covering the approved drug actually
claims the use for which the ANDA is applying.
Within this tapestry of laws and regulations, litigants have brought to light
many of the shortcomings of this system. For some, the cause of action lies in
a patent infringement suit to protect their research and development

62. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2000).
63. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, Federal Trade
Commission, July 2002, at 57 (hereinafter “FTC Study”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (citing Mova, 140 F.3d at 1074).
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2000).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(b)(12)(iii)(A) (1998).
67. Id. See also Purepac Pharma. Co v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194-95 (D.C.
2002); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2001), rev’d on other
grounds, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000) (making it an act of infringement to file a paragraph
(IV) certification).
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investments. For others, the causes of action are yet to be recognized by the
courts, for, as discussed below, the Hatch-Waxman Act failed to supply an
enforcement mechanism and, consequently, failed to include a deterrent for
over-aggressive use of patents through Orange Book listings. A number of
major players in the pharmaceutical drug industry, both branded and generics,
have been accused of “gaming” the system.69 None other than the Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission (“the FTC”) has testified to the United States
Senate that certain drug companies have used the system to secure greater
profits for themselves without creating a corresponding benefit to consumers.70
The FTC followed this testimony by preparing a detailed report (“the FTC
Study”) that investigated whether the 30-month stay and the 180-day market
exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act “are susceptible to strategies
to delay or deter consumer access to generic alternatives to brand-name drug
products.”71 The report notes that an increasing number of generic drug
manufacturers are seeking to enter the market before the expiration of patents
held by branded manufacturers.72 The FTC Study reveals that during the
1980s, only two percent of generic applications sought entry through the
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.73 From 1998 to 2000, however,
approximately 20 percent of the generic applications sought entry before patent
expiration.74 The FTC Study comprehensively studies the effects the HatchWaxman Act has had on generic drugs reaching the market and is also a
valuable resource for information regarding antitrust issues.75
The study reports that, according to the FDA, “from the time HatchWaxman became effective in 1984 through December 31, 2000, 8,019 ANDAs
were filed with the FDA.”76 Of these applications, 7,536 (94 percent) raised
no patent issues (i.e., they did not contain a paragraph (IV) certification).77 Six
percent, or 483, of the total number of ANDA’s did contain paragraph (IV)
certifications.78 These 483 ANDAs represented 130 unique brand name drug
products.79 The share of ANDAs containing paragraph (IV) certifications has
69. Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission, Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, Chairman Timothy J. Muris, April
23, 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm.
70. Id.
71. FTC Study, supra note 63, at i-ii.
72. Id.
73. Id. at ii.
74. Id.
75. Although antitrust issues are mentioned in this article, those issues warrant separate
study and, for the most, are not discussed in detail.
76. FTC Study, supra note 63, at 10. FDA staff provided this information to the FTC staff.
See id. at 10 n.42.
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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been increasing since the 1980’s, where in the years 1998-2000 20 percent of
the ANDAs contained paragraph (IV) certifications.80
One criticism the FTC Study makes of current practice is that the 30month stay provision has unduly delayed entry of generic drugs into the
market. The study reports that “[o]n average, the time required for FDA
review and approval was twenty-five months and fifteen days from the
application filing date in those cases where generic applicants filing a
paragraph IV certification were not sued (and thus could begin commercial
marketing once they had FDA approval).”81 The average time between the
filing of a patent infringement suit and a district court opinion was twenty-five
months and thirteen days.82 The average time between the filing of a patent
infringement suit and a court of appeals decision was thirty-seven months and
twenty days.83 In practice, even if the 30-month stay has expired, a generic
manufacturer is not likely to bring their product to market for fear of
infringement liability if a suit is still pending. The length of pending litigation,
however, will likely increase if the NDA holder asserts one or more patents
against the ANDA applicant.84
The length of stays has been increasing in recent years. These additional
months may be added on to a single 30-month stay when the NDA holder lists
an additional patent in the Orange Book after an ANDA has filed a
certification.85 The ANDA is then required to re-certify with respect to this
later-listed patent.86 This scenario allows for the NDA holder to have more
than one 30-month stay. These additional 30-month stays have added between
4 and 40 months beyond the original 30-month stay.87
The FTC Study recognizes that the 30-month stay is the tool used by NDA
holders to prevent generic entry into the market.88 In fact, the study suggest
that “[t]he 30-month stay provision of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
protects brand-name companies beyond their existing intellectual property
rights.”89 This conclusion is overly broad in that the stay would only extend
80. FTC Study, supra note 63 at 10.
81. Id. at iii.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The FTC Study reports that as of June 1, 2002, for 6 out of 7 cases that have been
pending for more than 30 months before a decision from a district court, the brand-name
company has alleged infringement of three or more patents. Id. The FTC study uses the term
“brand-name company” too broadly in that the NDA holder may or may not be a “brand-name
company.” Indeed, many NDA holders are drug manufacturers that make only generic drugs.
FTC Study, supra note 63, at iii.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 39.
89. FTC Study, supra note 63, at 39.
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existing rights if the patent was to expire during the 30-month stay. The stay,
however, can improperly exclude generic manufacturers if a patent is
improperly listed in the Orange Book. This improper listing is what has been a
source of criticism. The complaint is that these later-listed patents do not meet
the FDA requirements for listing in the Orange Book, or, in other words, the
patents do not claim the approved drugs or uses thereof. This has clearly
happened, and is discussed in the Neurontin® cases below. In these cases, a
use patent was later-issued and later-listed, the stay was continued, but the
court ultimately determined that the patent did not claim an approved use.
Thus, by continuing the stay, the NDA improperly extended their exclusivity
with respect to the approved drug and its approved uses.
Generic drug manufacturers, however, have been fairly successful in
infringement suits brought under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Of all the patent
infringement actions involving both the first ANDA to file a paragraph (IV)
certification and the second ANDA to do the same, generic applicants have
prevailed in seventy-three percent of the cases as of June 1, 2002.90 The FTC
looked at twenty-five decisions in which the generic manufacturer was
successful. In these cases, fourteen were decided on non-infringement and
eleven were decided on invalidity.91 The rate at which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned district court opinions involving
infringement of drug products was eight percent.92 Despite the odds favoring
generic manufacturers, there still exists the potential for “gaming” the system
(improper Orange Book listings). Moreover, avoiding such infringement
litigation in the first place would be less taxing on all participants, including
the ultimate consumers of the drugs.
What emerges from the FTC Study are a number of recommendations to
ameliorate the insufficiencies of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One recommendation
is that an NDA should be limited to invoking one 30-month stay per ANDA,
regardless if additional patents are listed.93 This is an interesting proposal, but
it penalizes an NDA holder having subsequent patents issue that legitimately
cover the approved drug or methods of use thereof. This could potentially
penalize an NDA for delays in the prosecution of the patent at the Patent and
Trademark Office. The FTC Study does recognize that there is no private right
of action to “de-list” patents, thus, focusing on the real problem—the propriety
of the Orange Book listings, not the number of 30-month stays.94

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at v.
FTC Study, supra note 63, at v.
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The study also suggests that certain classes of patents are not appropriate
to invoke the 30-month stay. These include: (1) metabolite patents;95 (2) drug
intermediate patents;96 (3) polymorph patents;97 and (4) “product by process
patents that claim a drug product produced by a specified process.”98 This
suggestion, however, should be taken with caution as it is not the type of patent
that causes an improper listing in the Orange Book, but rather the improper
overly broad assertion of its claims. The root problem rests with the fact there
is no recognized cause of action against an Orange Book listing; an NDA can
submit any relevant patent, even if it does not claim the approved drug or
approved uses thereof.
A number of cases are discussed below that shed light on the practices that
have developed under the Hatch-Waxman Act. In particular, because the use
of paragraph (IV) certifications has dramatically increased since 1998, the
majority of these cases are more recent. A selection of cases found below
involve one particular drug, Neurontin®. This, by no means, is the only drug
that has found itself embroiled in litigation due to the complexities of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. It is, however, one of the drugs for which there are a
number of published opinions and one in which the stays have reached an
exceptionally long time (fifty-three months).99
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND LITIGATION INVOLVING THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT
Many cases have involved some aspect of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Since
its passage in 1984, many courts have opined on its intricacies and nuances, of
which there are many. Below is a brief review of opinions that have been
selected to paint a broad picture of how various parties have found themselves
in litigation that somehow turns on interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
In particular, these cases are demonstrative of how aggrieved parties have been
frustrated by the statutory scheme and judicial interpretation thereof. The first
two cases show that the generic manufacturers have battled one another just as
they have battled brand name manufacturers. These cases affirm the need to
clarify the rights of both such parties.

95. “Patents that claim the chemical compound into which a patient’s body converts the
approved drug product.” Id. at 55.
96. “Patents that claim a chemical compound used during production of the active
ingredient, but not appearing in the final drug product.” Id.
97. “Patents that claim a crystalline form of the active ingredient that differs from the
approved crystalline form.” Id.
98. Id.
99. It should be noted that the lengthy pendency (time the application spends under
examination) of the later-listed patent with respect to Neurontin® caused it to be listed after the
ANDA holders had filed their initial certifications.
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In Mova Pharmaceutical Corporation v. Shalala,100 the plaintiff, Mova
Pharmaceutical Corporation (“Mova”), brought an action to compel the FDA
to withdraw or change the effective date of the approval of an ANDA
submitted by Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”) to market a generic
version of micronized glyburide, a drug used to treat diabetes.101 Mova had
filed an earlier application to market the same drug. Thus, they were the
second ANDA. Mova’s application, however, was delayed because the NDA
holder, Pharmacia & Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), brought a patent
infringement action against Mova.102
Mova essentially asked the FDA to delay approval of Mylan’s application
until Mova prevailed in the infringement suit or it began marketing its drug,
whichever event came first.103 The FDA countered, citing regulations that
allowed it “to approve Mylan’s application immediately because, at the time
Mylan submitted its application Mova had not yet ‘successfully defended’
against (that is prevailed in) Upjohn’s patent infringement suit.”104 Mova
argued the regulation was inconsistent with the section of Title 21 which
governs the 180-day exclusivity period.105
The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the FDA to
delay approval of Mylan’s ANDA.106 The FDA and Mylan appealed.107
Upjohn moved to intervene after the district court granted the injunction, but
their motion was denied. Upjohn appealed that decision.108 Importantly, for
reasons that are unclear (and were unclear to the appellate court as well),109
Upjohn did not bring suit against Mylan in the 45-day window after they filed
their paragraph (IV) certification, thus precluding them from enacting the 30month stay (really a suspension of FDA approval of Mylan’s ANDA), even if
suit was subsequently brought.110
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FDA has
overstepped its authority in enacting and applying the regulation at issue.111
After an exhaustive analysis of congressional intent, the Court held that the

100. 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
101. Id. at 1062.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1063 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1)).
105. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
106. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1063. Upjohn moved to intervene to argue against approval of Mylan’s application
in order to protect its exclusivity in the market. Id.
109. See id. at 1065.
110. See 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Upjohn did eventually sue Mylan. The court ultimately
ruled that Upjohn’s patent was invalid and not infringed. See Mova, 140 F.3d at 1065 n.5.
111. Id. at 1076.
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FDA’s enforcement of its regulation exceeded its statutory authority.112 The
intervenor, Upjohn, was consequently found to have a right to intervene
because, “a firm has constitutional standing to challenge a competitor’s entry
into its market.”113 This case demonstrates that an aggrieved ANDA, seeking
to protect its position, cannot seek redress from the FDA.
In a similar case, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Shalala,114 Mylan
brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the FDA’s
regulation governing when the 180-day period of market exclusivity begins.115
In this case, it was Mylan that succeeded in defending a patent infringement
action before its competitor but was second to have filed an ANDA containing
a paragraph (IV) certification. At the time Mylan prevailed in the infringement
litigation, its competitor was still defending a separate patent infringement
action.116 Mylan argued it was entitled to begin marketing and was entitled to
a 180-day market exclusivity period as well.
Interestingly, Mylan took a diametrically opposed position in this litigation
as compared to its position in the Mova case. This is because Mylan found
itself in the position of having filed the second ANDA with a paragraph (IV)
certification, unlike in the Mova case, where it sought to deny entry of the
second filed ANDA holder in to the market. As in Mova, the District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the FDA once again exceeded its statutory
authority in interpreting its regulations.117 Again, this shows the FDA
regulations need clarification and unambiguous statutory direction.
In one of the first cases to directly challenge the propriety of an Orange
Book listing of a patent, the FDA was allowed to reasonably rely on the
submissions of the NDA holder when determining which patents are properly
listed. In Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Henney,118 the NDA holder, BristolMeyers Squibb (“BMS”) claimed that the listed patent at issue claimed “a
method of using BuSpar® [the trade name of the drug at issue] for all of its
approved uses.”119 A generic drug manufacturer, Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.
(“Danbury”), challenged this listing because, according to Danbury, the patent
at issue only claimed a metabolite of BuSpar® and not the drug itself.120 The
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1074 (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970)).
114. 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
115. Mylan sought review of the FDA’s interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(e). Mylan, 81
F. Supp. 2d at 30. This issue centered on interpretation of the phrases “a court” and “the court”
and its bearing on when a generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity period begins to run. Id. at 3839.
116. Id. at 35.
117. Id. at 42.
118. 194 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Md. 2001).
119. Id. at 444.
120. Id.
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FDA sought clarification from BMS. BMS responded that the patent covered
both a method of using the metabolite and the basic drug itself.121 So, at least
here, there is a basic claim interpretation issue as opposed to the statutory and
regulatory interpretation issues in the two previously discussed cases.
The court held that the FDA was justified in relying upon the assertions of
BMS in maintaining the listing of the patent, thus avoiding the claim
interpretation issue altogether.122 The court sanctioned the FDA’s “very
limited, ministerial role” in listing patents in the Orange Book, finding that
“patent infringement issues [should] play out in other, proper arenas.”123 This
limited role has been subsequently upheld by higher courts.
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,124 another generic
manufacturer seeking to de-list the same patent at issue in Watson and
manufacture a generic version of BuSpar®, filed suit in the District of
Columbia. The district court granted relief, holding that Mylan was entitled to
declaratory relief because the patent at issue was improperly listed in the
Orange Book under the patent laws.125 The Declaratory Judgment Act was
also approved as a defense to the infringement suit BMS could have brought
against Mylan under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).126 The Federal Circuit, reversing
the decision below, held that a private cause of action to de-list patents found
in the Orange Book is not recognized under the Patent laws (Title 35) or the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (Title 21).127
The Federal Circuit based its opinion on the lack of an explicit provision in
the Hatch-Waxman Act either enabling or prohibiting a private cause of action
to challenge a patentee’s listing of a patent in the Orange Book.128 The court
found such an action to be “an impermissible attempt by a private party to
enforce the FFDCA”129 and further, that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not

121. Id.
122. Id. at 445.
123. Watson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
124. 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
125. Id. at 1325.
126. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-13. In this case, the facts are
especially drastic. On the day BMS’s one patent was set to expire, a day on which Mylan had
manufactured and was prepared to ship its product, BMS listed the patent at issue, thereby
triggering the duty of Mylan to make further certifications with respect to the newly listed patent.
Mylan, 268 F.3d at 1327. This prompted Mylan to seek injunctive relief regarding this second
patent. See id.
127. Id. at 1332-33.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1330 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) and stating “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)
of this section [regarding suits by states in their own names], all such proceedings for the
enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United
States.”).
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provide grounds to bring such suit either.130 This case clearly closes the door
on private causes of action to correct improper Orange Book listings.
BMS, although insulated from de-listing its patents, has been subject to
antitrust lawsuits for its patent listing practice.131 The plaintiffs in the antitrust
action comprised, among others, generic drug manufacturers. Resolving
improper listings by an antitrust cause of action is obviously costly for both the
plaintiffs and certainly maintains the high cost of the drug at issue until the suit
is resolved. Such antitrust cases clearly indicate the need for a private cause of
action regarding Orange Book listings.
One other possible route that an aggrieved party could take, by utilizing the
Administrative Procedure Act, has also been foreclosed. In aaiPharma Inc. v.
Thompson, the Fourth Circuit held that the FDA does not violate that
Administrative Procedure Act by taking a “purely ministerial” role in Orange
Book listings.132 In an interesting twist, the plaintiff, aaiPharma, sought to
have its patent listed in the Orange Book along with the NDA holder’s
patents.133 After approaching the NDA holder with such a request, and being
rebuffed, aaiPharma approached the FDA, which also refused to list the
patent.134 aaiPharma wanted such patent listed to prevent other generic
manufacturers from entering the market.
The cases discussed above demonstrate that there are many aggrieved
parties with respect to Orange Book listings. The cases also reveal that these
parties have been met with resistance in attempting to correct what they feel is
an inequitable wrong. The courts, on the one hand, seem to have sided with
the branded drug manufacturers, but on the other hand, they have articulated
that that they are bound by the clear language Congress used in the HatchWaxman Act. Patentees should always be able to extract the entirety of their
legal monopoly from a patent. They should not, however, have unchecked
abilities that allow for inequitable extension of the rights conferred under the
patent laws. The story of one drug, gabapentin hydrochloride, set forth below,
is particularly helpful in exposing some of the shortcomings of the HatchWaxman Act.

130. Mylan, 268 F.3d at 1330. See also Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a generic drug manufacturer cannot bring a declaratory judgment
action or an injunctive action against a NDA holder under the Hatch-Waxman provisions of the
FDCA or the patent laws requiring it to de-list a patent from the Orange Book).
131. See In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
BMS was not entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity against claims arising out of its allegedly
fraudulent listing of its patents in the Orange Book).
132. 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002).
133. Id. at 233.
134. Id.
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III. THE SAGA OF GABAPENTIN HYDROCHLORIDE
The saga of Neurontin® began some time ago. Before diving into this
history, it is helpful to review some practices common in the medical and
pharmaceutical industries that underscore the deficiencies of the Act. In
particular, the ability of doctors to prescribe “off-label” use for prescription
medication is what drives the story behind Neurontin®.
Under the FDCA,135 new pharmaceutical drugs cannot be distributed in
interstate commerce unless the manufacturer of the drug demonstrates to the
FDA that the drug is safe and effective for a particular and intended use.136
When a drug is approved for a single use, however, the FDA will not prevent a
doctor from prescribing that drug for uses other than the FDA-approved use.137
Allowing physicians “to prescribe drugs for such ‘off-label’ usage ‘is an
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate
[pharmaceuticals] without directly interfering with the practice of
medicine.”138
The difficulty arises because, although the FDA allows physicians to
prescribe drugs for off-label uses, it does not allow manufacturers, generic or
branded, to market or promote drugs for off-label uses.139 The governing
statute expressly prohibits distribution of a drug for non-approved uses140 and
distribution of “misbranded” drug.141 A “misbranded” drug is a drug for which
the manufacturer has included on the label non-FDA-approved uses. For
example, if the drug Neurontin® is only approved for the treatment of epilepsy
(which it was for a long while), the label cannot suggest or instruct that it may
be used to treat bi-polar disorder. Simply including information on a drug’s
label about an “off-label” use will result in “misbranding.”142 A manufacturer
wishing to promote a drug for an “off label” use must submit materials to the
FDA where they undergo rigorous review. If the manufacturer wants the drug
to be labeled for this new usage, then the manufacturer must submit the safety
and efficacy tests that were required for the first use.143
Drug companies may seek wide-spread use of a drug for all purposes, both
labeled and “off-label.” A labeled use is valuable because FDA approval
largely determines whether a prescription for that drug will be reimbursed
135. See supra note 3, at § 301-397.
136. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) & (d) (2000).
137. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D. Mass. 2001)
(citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)).
138. Id.
139. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
140. Id.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
142. See Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
143. See id. at 334 (setting forth the requirements of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa, et seq.).
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under the federal Medicaid program.144 However, as seen in the case of
Neurontin®, off-label sales may form the bulk of a drug’s sale.
A.

Background of Neurontin®

Neurontin® is the brand name for a drug having gabapentin as the active
ingredient. The drug was first approved for use in 1993 as an adjunctive
therapy in the treatment of partial seizures with and without secondary
generalization in adults with epilepsy in doses from 900 to 1,800 mg per day.
Since its introduction and first approval, Neurontin® has been prescribed for
many off-label uses. The approved usage, however, remained solely for the
treatment of epilepsy until mid-2002 when the FDA approved Neurontin® for
postherpetic neuralgia.145 These uses range from pain control, as monotherapy for epilepsy, for control of bipolar disorder, and as a treatment for
attention deficit disorder.
The drug was brought to market by the
pharmaceutical company Parke-Davis.
Parke-Davis later became the
pharmaceutical products division of the Warner-Lambert Company. To
complete the large-fish-eat-smaller-fish trend, Warner-Lambert, including the
Parke-Davis division, was acquired by Pfizer, Inc., another pharmaceutical
manufacturer. Pfizer, however, has stayed above the fray and has taken the
position that it is only cleaning up the mess, if any, that its predecessors-ininterest wrought.
B.

Opinions Involving Neurontin®

There are now more than twenty reported cases that mention the drug
Neurontin®. Not all of these involve Orange Book listings. Many involve
long lists of medications that litigants were taking with such causes of action
sounding in personal injury torts or denial of governmental assistance with the
purchase of medication. The remainder of the suits, the focus of this section,
are exemplary of the problems inherent in the Hatch-Waxman Act. As an
overview, it is helpful to know that Neurontin® has received two “30-month
stays” for a total length of fifty-three months, with the second stay beginning at
the twenty-third month of the first stay.146 It is important to note is that generic
manufacturers did not immediately attempt to enter the market, i.e., challenge
144. Medicaid is, in most circumstances, available only for “covered outpatient drugs.” 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10) (2000). Covered outpatient drugs do not include drugs that are “used for a
medical indication which is not a medically accepted indication.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(3). A
medically accepted indication, in turn, includes a use “which is approved under the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act” or which is included in specified drug compendia. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r8(k)(6). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (identifying compendia to be consulted).
145. This particular use is protected by a three-year, non-patent market exclusivity conferred
by a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Those provisions are not relevant to this article. See
Purepac Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002).
146. See FTC Study, supra note 63, at 49.
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the composition and approved use patents, the first listed patents. It was only
when a later-issued patent was listed in the Orange Book did litigation ensue.
In an attempt to make sense of the tangled web Neurontin® has weaved in
both the courts and the FDA, the cases are discussed below to provide a broad
picture of the system and its failures, for both branded and generic drug
manufacturers and the public.
1.

Purepac and Apotex - The Generic’s Perspective

On January 16, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that it is not an act of infringement for a drug manufacturer to
submit an ANDA for approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug
nor that use is covered by an existing patent, and the patent at issue is for a use
not approved by the FDA under an NDA.147 This is a mouthful, but the upshot
is that a new drug applicant, having received approval for a particular use of a
drug, cannot use the rights conferred under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) to subject
an abbreviated new drug applicant to infringement liability or to extend their
exclusivity afforded by their patents when the new drug applicant’s listed
patents claim a use different from the use for which the abbreviated new drug
applicant seeks approval. Surprisingly, this simple concept wound up before
the Federal Circuit.
In Warner-Lambert Company v. Apotex Corporation,148 the assignee of
United States Patent 5,084,479 (“the ‘479 patent” or “the neurodegenerative
patent”),149 entitled “Novel Methods for Treating Neurodegenerative
Diseases,” the Warner-Lambert Company (“Warner-Lambert”) filed an
infringement action against Apotex Corporation, Apotex, Inc., and TorPharm,
Inc. (collectively “Apotex”). The ‘479 patent claims the use of certain cyclic
amino acid compounds, as well as the salts and esters derived from them, for
the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases such as stroke, Alzheimer’s
disease, Huntington’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and Parkinson’s
disease.150 One of these cyclic amino acid compounds, 1-aminomethyl-1-

147. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
148. 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
149. The “‘479 patent” is set to expire in January of 2010. Id. at 1361.
150. Claim 1, the only independent claim in the “‘479 patent”, defines the invention as
follows:
1. A method for treating neurodegenerative diseases which comprises administering
a therapeutically effective amount of a compound of formula
H2N—CH2—C—CH2—COOR1
(CH2)
wherein R1 is hydrogen or a lower alkyl and n is 4, 5, or 6 or pharmaceutically acceptable
salt thereof, in unit dosage form, to a mammal in need of said treatment.
Id. at 1351.
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cyclohexane acetic acid is commonly known as “gabapentin.” Gabapentin is
what this, and the subsequently discussed cases, concern.
Warner-Lambert is also the assignee of expired U.S. Patent 4,024,175,
expired U.S Patent 4,087,544, and U.S. Patent 4,894,476. The ‘175 patent (the
“product patent”), entitled “Cyclic Amino Acids,” disclosed and claimed the
actual compounds that are used in the methods claimed in the
neurodegenerative method patent; claim 2 specifically claimed 1-aminomethyl1-cyclohexane acetic acid (i.e., gabapentin). The ‘544 patent (“the epilepsy
method”), entitled “Treatments of Cranial Dysfunctions using Novel Cyclic
Amino Acids,” disclosed and claimed a method of treating certain forms of
epilepsy, faintness attacks, hypokinesia, and cranial traumas using the cyclic
amino acid compounds claimed in the product patent and used in the methods
of the neurodegenerative method patent, again including gabapentin. The ‘476
patent (the “monohydrate patent”), entitled “Gabapentin Monohydrate and a
Process for Producing the Same,” claims a specific crystalline form of
gabapentin monohydrate. 151 It is the listing of these patents, and in particular
the ‘479 neurodegenerative patent, in the Orange Book that gives rise to the
suits discussed herein.
On April 17, 1998 Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application
under the Hatch-Waxman Act seeking approval for a generic formulation to
treat epilepsy upon the expiration of the epilepsy method patent on January 16,
2000. Apotex sought FDA approval to market gabapentin only for the same
use or “indication” for which it was approved under Warner-Lambert’s NDA,
i.e., for “adjunctive therapy in the treatment of partial seizures without
secondary generalization in adults with epilepsy.” Under the Act, Apotex
could seek approval only for previously approved uses.152
With
its
ANDA,
Apotex
submitted
the
required
bioavailability/bioequivalence test data and a certification under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (“the paragraph (IV) certification”) declaring that its
proposed manufacture, use, and sale of gabapentin would not infringe either
the monohydrate patent or the neurodegenerative method patent.153 Apotex
stated that its formulation would be anhydrous (i.e., would not contain water),
and would, “accordingly, be outside the scope of the monohydrate patent.”154
Importantly, Apotex declared that its “pharmaceutical product’s labeling does
not include any indication for use in the treatment of either neurodegenerative
method patent.”155 Apotex argued that because all of the claims of the
neurodegenerative method patent “are directed to a use of gabapentin in the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1352 (recounting the coverage of Warner-Lambert’s related patents).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1352.
Id.
Id.
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treatment of neurodegenerative diseases,” Apotex’s manufacture, use, or sale
of its gabapentin products for the treatment of epilepsy would not infringe the
neurodegenerative method patent.156 It is important to note that the treatment
of epilepsy is not the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases.
An ANDA who files a paragraph (IV) certification must, under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(i), include in its application a statement that it will give notice
of that filing to the owner of the patent to which the certification pertains157
and to the holder of the approved NDA for that drug.158 Pursuant to this duty,
Apotex notified Warner-Lambert that it had filed the ANDA and paragraph
(IV) certification.159 In addition, and as required by statute, Apotex included in
its notice letter a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for its opinion
of non-infringement of the neurodegenerative method patent.160 This letter
explained that the use for which Apotex sought approval is for the treatment of
partial seizure and the ‘479 neurodegenerative patent does not claim a method
of using gabapentin and its derivatives for partial seizure.161 Apotex’s
argument was simple, because the ‘479 patent claims are directed to “a method
of using gabapentin and its derivatives in the treatment of neurodegenerative
disease,” the product marketed by Apotex would “not fall within the scope of
any of the claims of the . . . ‘479 patent.”162
In response to Apotex’s ANDA filing, Warner-Lambert filed an
infringement action on July 14, 1998, alleging that Apotex’s submission of its
ANDA was an act of infringement of the neurodegenerative method patent
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).163 Despite the fact that the FDA had not
approved gabapentin for any of the indications claimed in the
neurodegenerative method patent, and FDA regulations forbid the promotion
of unapproved uses by NDA or ANDA holders,164 Warner-Lambert argued that
“patients will use the Apotex Defendants’ gabapentin for all purposes for
which Neurontin® product has been and customarily is used, and doctors will
prescribe the Apotex Defendants’ gabapentin product for such uses, including
the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases.”165

156. Id.
157. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2000).
158. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2000).
159. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1352-53.
160. Id. at 1353.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Warner-Lambert also included a claim under the monohydrate patent. The district court
granted summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to the patent on March 2, 2001.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 4293, Doc. No. 67 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2001).
Warner-Lambert did not appeal this judgment.
164. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (1998).
165. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1353.
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Apotex moved for summary judgment. Warner-Lambert countered by
arguing that (1) the FDA does not regulate the uses for which doctors prescribe
drugs once they are approved, (2) “more than three-quarters of the
prescriptions written by doctors for Warner-Lambert’s Neurontin® are for
indications other than epilepsy, including the treatment of neurodegenerative
diseases,” and (3) “doctors, managed care organizations, and other institutions
commonly and routinely substitute generic drugs for all indications for which
the brand name drug is used.”166 Warner-Lambert further argued that Apotex
knows, and even expects, that its generic gabapentin, if approved by the FDA,
“will be prescribed by doctors for all the same reasons they prescribe
Neurontin®,” including “the treatment of . . . neurodegenerative diseases.”167
The district court denied Apotex’s motion.168 At the close of discovery,
Apotex again moved for summary judgment. The district court granted this
second motion.169 Warner-Lambert appealed this decision.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit framed the issue as whether it is an act of
infringement under the applicable statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2),170 “to submit
an ANDA seeking approval to make, use, or sell a drug for an approved use if
any other use of the drug is claimed in a patent, or if it is only an act of
infringement to submit an ANDA seeking approval to make, use, or sell a drug
if the drug or the use for which FDA approval is sought is claimed in a
patent.”171 The issue was recognized as one of first impression for the court.172
The court held that “it is not an act of infringement to submit an ANDA for
approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug nor that use is
covered by an existing patent, and the patent at issue is for a use not approved
under the NDA.”173

166. Id. (citing Warner-Lambert’s “Memorandum in Opposition to Aptoex’s Motion for
Summary Judgment” at 20 (filed December 10, 1998)).
167. Id.
168. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 4293, 1999 WL 259946 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
8, 1999).
169. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 4293, 2001 WL 1104618 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
14, 2001).
170. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000) provides:
It shall be an act of infringement to submit – (A) an application under section 505(j)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [codified at 21 U.S.C. §355(j); i.e., and
ANDA] . . . for a drug claimed in a patent, . . . if the purpose of such submission is to
obtain approval under such Act [i.e., Title 21 of the United States Code] to engage in the
commercial manufacturer, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of
which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000).
171. Warner-Lambert Co., 316 F.3d at 1354.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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The court accepted Apotex’s argument that because an ANDA may not
seek approval for an unapproved or off-label use of a drug under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(i), “it necessarily follows that 35 U.S.C. [§] 271(e)(2)(A) does not
apply to a use patent claiming only such a use.”174 The court emphasized that
the infringement mechanisms provided by 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2) may only be
used against an ANDA when the NDA’s listed patents claim “the use” for
which the NDA is seeking approval.175 In addition, the court noted that “[t]he
FDA does not grant across-the-board approval to market a drug.”176 Rather,
the agency grants approval to make, use, and sell a drug for a specific purpose
for which that drug has been demonstrated to be safe and efficacious.177
Warner-Lambert argued that Apotex was required to submit a certification
under one of the paragraphs of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)178 with respect to
the ‘479 neurodegenerative patent because that patent was listed in the Orange
Book.179 The court noted that such certification need only be made when the
listed patent “claims a use for such listed drugs for which the applicant is
seeking approval . . . .”180 Apotex did, in fact, file such certification, labeled as
a paragraph (IV) certification, stating that it is not applying for approval to
market the drug for a non-approved use.181 Indeed, Apotex’s action is
consistent with the statute because an ANDA may not obtain approval to
market the drug for a non-approved use without filing its own NDA with full
safety and efficacy data. The Federal Circuit, however, noted that Apotex’s
paragraph (IV) certification was essentially a statement of non-applicable use
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), a “section (viii) statement.”182 This
is remarkable because Apotex’s competitor, Purepac, did just that and met with
considerably less success than Apotex. In fact, Purepac’s decision to make
such a statement cost it its priority and rights as the first to file an ANDA,
discussed below.183 Despite the removal of the ‘479 patent from the thicket of

174. Id. at 1356.
175. Id.
176. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1356.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 39, at 28,908.
179. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1360.
180. Id. at 1360 (emphasis removed) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)).
181. Id. at 1352.
182. Id. at 1362. See supra note 65, at § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) for a discussion of a “section (viii)
statement.”
183. The Federal Circuit also held that Apotex would not induce infringement of the ‘479
patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1363. Warner-Lambert argued
that because by 1998 only 22% of the Neurontin® prescriptions were for the treatment of
epilepsy, the remaining 78% were being prescribed for off-label uses, including the infringing use
of treating neurodegenerative diseases. Id. Warner-Lambert added that by 1999, the percentage
of uses other than to treat epilepsy had risen to 89%. Id. Additionally, Warner-Lambert argued
that:
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potential protection, Pfizer stated that the introduction of generic gabapentin
would not change.184
About a month before Federal Circuit rendered its decision in WarnerLambert, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., the United States District Court, District of
Columbia, dealt a fatal blow to the ANDA of Apotex’s competitor, Purepac
Pharmaceutical (“Purepac”), and its effort to obtain FDA approval to market
gabapentin. In Purepac Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Thompson,185 the Court
rebuffed Purepac’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to require the
FDA to accept, and thus approve, Purepac’s ANDA seeking to market a
generic version of gabapentin “for the treatment of epilepsy.”186 Purepac also

(1) it is common knowledge to many in and out of the pharmaceutical field that
physicians routinely prescribe approved drugs for purposes other than those listed on the
drugs’ labels; indeed, such off-label use is supported by both the FDA and the American
Medical Association, (2) information regarding both on- and off-label prescriptions is
readily available to the public from publications and databases to which most
pharmaceutical companies subscribe, (3) “pharmacists and other drug dispensing
organizations . . . commonly substitute generic drugs for name brand drugs wherever
possible – unless specifically instructed otherwise by the physician writing the
prescription,” and, “in many states, substitution is mandatory,” and (4) Apotex expects to
get an “A-B rating” for its gabapentin, which would allow physicians and pharmacists to
substitute generic gabapentin for Neurontin® regardless of the indication for which it is to
be used, and (5) Apotex should be assumed to have considered the market size and growth
potential of gabapentin when it made the strategic decision to file an ANDA and enter the
gabapentin market.
See id. at 1364. Essentially, Warner-Lambert is arguing that Apotex is going for the
“off-label” market and not the epilepsy treatment market. Id. The Court rejected WarnerLambert’s arguments, reasoning that even if Apotex knew that doctors could prescribe gabapentin
for possibly infringing uses, the “mere knowledge of possible infringement by others does not
amount to inducement; specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.”
Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1364 (citing Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d
544, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Apparently Warner-Lambert did not present the requisite evidence.
Id.
184. Pfizer’s January 16, 2003 press release, released the same day as the Federal Circuit’s
opinion, stated that:
Today’s Appellate Court decision concerning the Neurontin ‘479 neurodegenerative
disease patent has no bearing on the likelihood or timing for the entry of generic
gabapentin. Pfizer continues to believe that the likelihood and timing of generic entry
will depend on FDA decisions regarding approval of generic applications and ultimately
on the outcome of the litigation relating to its ‘482 patent. Today’s court decision does
not affect the status of the litigation on the ‘482 patent.
Press Release Pfizer (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.pfizer.com/are/news_releases/
mn_2003_0116.html. Warner-Lambert is currently defending an infringement action related to
the claims of the ‘482 patent. See supra note 136, at § 355(d).
185. Purepac Pharm., Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002).
186. Id. at 195.
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sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent the ANDA’s of its competitors, including
Apotex, from being approved by the FDA.187
In Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, Purepac, a generic drug
manufacturer, sought FDA approval to sell gabapentin only for the treatment
of epilepsy, and no other use.188 This is consistent with the regulations and
statutes because, as discussed above, an ANDA can only seek approval for a
use already approved under a NDA.
Purepac, in preparing its ANDA, reviewed the same Orange Book-listed
patents as those Apotex reviewed. Purepac, however, decided to submit only a
section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 patent, as opposed to the
strategy adopted by Apotex, which submitted both a section (viii) statement
and a paragraph (IV) certification.189 The paragraph (IV) statement submitted
by Apotex, according to the Federal Circuit, “although formally labeled as a
‘paragraph IV certification,’ . . . with respect to the neurodegenerative method
patent [it] was effectively a statement of non-applicable use pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).”190 Thus, faced with a use patent that claims a
non-approved use, one generic filed a paragraph (IV) statement (which the
Federal Court said was technically a section (viii) statement) while another
filed a section (viii) statement. The District Court for the District of Columbia,
of course not having the Federal Circuit’s opinion before it, was asked to
enjoin the FDA from approving Apotex’s ANDA and to determine whether the
FDA’s denial of Purepac’s ANDA, containing only a section (viii) statement,
violated the Administrative Procedure Act.191 Purepac was ultimately denied
relief by the court.
This all began in March 1998 when Purepac filed an ANDA with the FDA
seeking approval to market generic versions of gabapentin tablets and capsules
for the treatment of epilepsy.192 With its ANDA, Purepac submitted patent
declarations with respect to the patents listed by Warner-Lambert.193 Purepac
submitted a paragraph (III) certification with respect to the ‘544 epilepsy
method patent as it was set to expire on July 16, 2000.194 Purepac submitted
paragraph (IV) certifications for the ‘476 monohydrate and the ‘482 patents.195
In contrast to these statements, and pertinent to this review, Purepac submitted
a section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 neurodegenerative disease

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
ANDA.

Id.
Id.
See Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1360; Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 200 n.13.
Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1360.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
Id. at 199.
When the ‘544 patent expired, it was removed from the Orange Book. See id. at 198 n.9.
U.S. Pat. No. 6,054,482 (issued Apr. 25, 2000). The claims are not relevant to Purepac’s
Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 197 n.7.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

“ORANGE BOOK” LISTING OF PATENTS UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

1053

patent. Purepac defended its submission of a section (viii) statement with
respect to the ‘479 by asserting that, based on Warner-Lambert’s submissions
to the FDA196 and the FDA’s use code assigned to the ‘479 patent,197 the ‘479
patent claimed the use of gabapentin to treat neurodegenerative diseases.
Because its ANDA was seeking approval to market gabapentin to treat
epilepsy, Purepac “concluded that a section (viii) statement was
appropriate.”198
Purepac defended its use of a section (viii) statement in a March 5, 1999
letter to the FDA.199 In this letter, Purepac argues that a section (viii)
statement is proper, and that a paragraph (IV) certification is improper, because
“the ‘479 patent is a method of use patent covering an indication which is not
present in the innovator’s [Warner-Lambert’s] approved labeling.”200 The
FDA responded by stating that it was not the agency’s duty to correct
information in Orange Book listings and informed Purepac of its right to use
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) to challenge Warner-Lambert’s submission of the ‘479
patent for inclusion in the Orange Book.201 Interestingly, the FDA’s letter
indicated that it had contacted Warner-Lambert’s patent attorney, who,
incidentally, verified the propriety of the ‘479 patent’s listing in the Orange
Book. Based on this, the FDA concluded that it could not confirm that the use
of a section (viii) statement was proper. To recapitulate, although WarnerLambert had affirmatively stated that the ‘479 patent only claims the use of
Neurontin® to treat neurodegenerative disease, coupled with the fact that the
FDA gave the ‘479 patent a use code different from the approved use, the FDA
still would accept Purepac’s section (viii) statement simply because Warner196. During the NDA process, Warner-Lambert declared at least twice that the ‘479 patent
claims a method for treating neurodegenerative diseases. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1352. In
other statements, Warner-Lambert declared that “the ‘479 patent, the ‘544 patent, and the ‘476
patent together ‘cover the composition, formulation and/or method use of Neurontin®.”’
Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 198. Warner-Lambert did not, however, specify if they were
asserting any particular use. Id. at 198 n.10.
197. When patents are submitted to the FDA for Orange Book listing the FDA assigns “use
codes” to the patents. Id. at 198. The codes “allow interested parties, including ANDA
applicants, to determine the particular medical uses of brand-name drugs asserted by the various
use patents listed in the Orange Book.” Id. See also Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,346 (“In
addition for a use patent, FDA includes in the Orange Book a code identifying the indication
covered by the patent.”).
198. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) is discussed in Section IV, infra. Purepac, at oral argument,
stated that it chose not to invoke 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) because it had no dispute over WarnerLambert’s listing of the patent since neither company treated the ‘470 patent as claming the use of
treating epilepsy. Id. In hindsight, it is apparent that Purepac should have attempted to invoke
this regulatory measure. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
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Lambert maintained its listing in the Orange Book. Essentially, through
additional letters to Purepac, the FDA took the position that if a party lists a
patent in the Orange Book and there is only one approved use, any use patents
listed must somehow claim that use (otherwise that party would be improperly
listing a patent).
Ultimately, the FDA resolved that if Purepac wanted its ANDA approved,
it had to submit a paragraph (IV) certification, and thus, expose itself to
infringement liability and suffer the consequences of a 30-month stay.202
Purepac knew that Warner-Lambert would not hesitate to bring suit under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) as Warner-Lambert had already brought suit against Purepac
and Apotex for paragraph (IV) statements regarding patents other than the ‘479
patent, the Orange Book listing of which is not questioned. Thus, the FDA
refused to approve Purepac’s ANDA without a paragraph (IV) statement
regarding the ‘479 patent.203
Meanwhile, Purepac’s competitor, Apotex, had submitted an ANDA
containing both a paragraph (IV) and a section (viii) statement with respect to
the ‘479 patent. Although Apotex was the second company to file an ANDA
seeking to market gabapentin,204 it was the first to file an ANDA containing a
paragraph (IV) certification with respect to the ‘479 patent (making it eligible
for the 180-day market exclusivity period and making it liable for an
infringement action). As discussed above, Warner-Lambert did bring suit
against Apotex. The Federal Circuit ultimately held that Apotex’s paragraph
(IV) certification was, in essence, the same as a section (viii) statement, and
that Warner-Lambert did not have a cause of action against Apotex under 35
U.S.C. 271(e)(2).205
In related litigation, Warner-Lambert had already brought suit against
Purepac in two separate actions in New Jersey. Inexplicably, one action was
based on Purepac’s section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 patent
(recall, a section (viii) statement does not give rise to a cause of action, a
paragraph (IV) certification is a condition precedent to any such suit). The
other action was based on the ‘476 patent, for which Purepac had filed a
paragraph (IV) certification. In addition, Warner-Lambert brought an
infringement action against Purepac for its paragraph (IV) certification with
respect to the ‘482 patent as well. In light of this litigation, it is reasonable for
Purepac to want to avoid additional litigation by simply supplying a section
(viii) statement with its ANDA with respect to the ‘479 patent.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Apotex’s application was filed April 17, 1998. Id. at 200. Purepac’s application,
containing the section (viii) statement was filed March 1998. Id. at 198.
205. Warner-Lambert also brought a Section 271(e)(2) infringement action against Apotex for
its filing of an ANDA containing a paragraph (IV) certification with respect to the ‘482 patent.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Purepac, faced with the FDA approving Apotex’s ANDA after the stay
was lifted in that action, brought suit against the FDA seeking to enjoin it from
acting on Apotex’s application and seeking an order directing the FDA to
approve its application.206 The court ultimately refused to enjoin the FDA
from acting on Apotex’s application.207 With the resolution of WarnerLambert’s suit against Apotex, as resolved by the Federal Circuit, the FDA
will likely approve Apotex’s ANDA for gabapentin unless Warner-Lambert
successfully appeals to the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Purepac’s
decision to submit a section (viii) statement, instead of a paragraph (IV)
certification, will likely result in the approval of its competitor’s ANDA before
its own, resulting in loss of the 180-day market exclusivity period. This is
Purepac’s lot, despite the Federal Circuit, one month later, holding that the
Apotex’s paragraph (IV) certification was essentially a section (viii) statement
and that Warner-Lambert did not have a cause of action against an ANDA
submitting a section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 patent.
For the sake of resolution, it should be noted that the district court deciding
Purepac’s fate held that the FDA had no rational basis for denying Purepac’s
ANDA for gabapentin because of their inclusion of the section (viii)
statement.208 The court stated that the FDA’s position that the ‘479 patent
claims the use of treating epilepsy, simply because it is listed in the Orange
Book for a drug that had only one approved use (treating epilepsy) could not
stand.209 The FDA, throughout the controversy, insisted that the issue
concerned the ‘479 patent claims, and that it was not equipped to make such
determinations.210 The FDA, in fact, has specifically disclaimed any role in
determining what uses a particular patent claims.211
The agency’s “self-abnegation” creates a possible conflict between NDA
holders and ANDA applicants over the proper scope of a use patent.
Essentially the facts would be similar to that surrounding Purepac’s ANDA for
gabapentin. The NDA would list various patents in the Orange Book,
including composition, formulation, and use patents. The use patents listed
would include both approved and non-approved uses. If there was only one
approved use, the FDA (or some other arbitrator, e.g., the courts) would then

206. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
207. Id. at 211.
208. Id. at 204.
209. Id. at 205.
210. Id.
211. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 204. See also Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,345 (the “FDA
does not have the resources to review patent information for its accuracy and relevance to an
NDA.”); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. supra note 33, at 28,909
(“Because the FDA has no experience in the field of patents, the agency has no basis for
determining whether a use patent covers the use sought by the generic applicant.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1056

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1027

have to determine whether the listed use patents claimed the approved use.
The FDA has long taken the position that it does not want this job.212 The
courts have upheld the FDA as taking a “purely ministerial” role.213 The
resulting situation, however, is that a generic manufacturer, making an
absolutely proper section (viii) statement, can lose its priority to a subsequent
ANDA by the competitor taking the risk to file the first paragraph (IV)
certification.
2.

Neurontin® in Other Cases

There are a total of twenty-five published cases mentioning Neurontin®.
Six of these involve Warner-Lambert’s Orange Book listings. There are the
suits brought against Apotex and Purepac, the district court decisions and the
Federal Circuit decision. The majority of these cases, sixteen, are cases
involving individuals bringing suit for various causes of action against the
Commissioner of Social Security and other government agency heads in order
to receive Neurontin® as a prescription drug. These cases do not involve the
Orange Book listings. Two other cases are worth mentioning, as is a recently
coordinated multidistrict litigation antitrust action.
In the antitrust litigation,214 seventeen antitrust actions pending in six
districts were transferred to a single district in the District of New Jersey.215
All of the actions are purported class actions alleging that Warner-Lambert
Co., and its parent, Pfizer, Inc., violated antitrust laws and excluded generic
competition for gabapentin by “bringing sham patent infringement actions
against a number of generic drug manufacturers.”216 A number of the
underlying plaintiffs are organizations that pay for prescription drugs.217 As
the antitrust suit continues to play out, it will, undoubtedly, look to the various
decisions involving Orange Book listings by Warner-Lambert. The use of
antitrust law is certainly one way that potential inequitable results brought
about by improper Orange Book listings could be remedied. It is, however,
212. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 59
Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,348 (October 3, 1994).
213. See aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 243 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
FDA’s “purely ministerial approach to the Orange Book listing process.”).
214. See In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation) for the latest order consolidating seventeen antitrust actions pending in
six districts.
215. The case consolidated seven actions in the Southern District of New York, five actions in
the District of New Jersey, two actions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and one each in
the Northern District of California, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Eastern District of
New York. Id.
216. Id.
217. Some of the plaintiffs include: Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., Health &
Benefit Trust Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local Union 94, and
Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia. Id. at 1381-82.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

“ORANGE BOOK” LISTING OF PATENTS UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

1057

only partially satisfactory because it would still allow a company to list the
patents in the first place, thus causing unneeded patent litigation.
The remaining two cases involve a former Parke-Davis employee who
brought a qui tam action against his former employer. In United States ex rel.
Franklin v. Parke-Davis218 the qui tam relator brought an action under the
False Claims Act (“FCA”)219 against Parke-Davis alleging, inter alia, that
Parke-Davis engaged in a fraudulent scheme to promote sale of drugs for “offlabel” uses and that the illegal marketing campaign caused the submission of
false claims to the Veteran’s Administration and to the federal government for
Medicaid reimbursement.220 This case is still pending, but from it, two
published opinions have issued.221
In these two opinions, the relator, Dr. David Franklin, alleges that ParkeDavis engaged in a fraudulent scheme to promote the sale of Neurontin® for
“off-label” uses. Dr. Franklin222 conveys the tale as a Parke-Davis employee
over the entire five months he worked as a “medical liaison” in 1996.223 Dr.
Franklin alleges that despite Neurontin® being solely approved for the
treatment of epilepsy in doses from 900 to 1,800 mg per day, Parke-Davis
instructed its medical liaisons to make exaggerated or false-claims concerning
the safety and efficacy of Neurontin® for “off-label” uses.224 The liaisons,
allegedly, were instructed to convey that Neurontin® could be prescribed for
various off-label uses in amounts up to 4,800 mg per day.225 Parke-Davis also
allegedly instructed doctors on how to receive government reimbursement for
prescriptions written for off-label uses and gave illegal “kickbacks” to doctors
in forms varying from sums of money for “drug studies” and for their services
as “consultants” or “preceptors.”226 Dr. Franklin’s nine-count qui tam action
remained filed under seal for almost five years before the United States finally
decided to participate, but only in the capacity of amicus curiae.227 At this
point in the litigation, the claims regarding Neurontin® survived motions to
dismiss for failure to plead the fraud aspects with the requisite particularity.228
218. There are two reported decisions in this case, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001); and
210 F.R.D. 257 (D. Mass. 2002).
219. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-33 (2000).
220. United States ex rel Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D. Mass. 2001).
221. See id.
222. Dr. Franklin holds a doctorate degree in biology, has co-authored five scientific
publications, is listed as the inventor on a patent application (pending as of 2001), and received a
two-year research fellowship with Harvard Medical School and the Dana Farber Cancer Institute
in Boston in 1992. Id. at 44.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 45.
225. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
226. Id. at 46.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 49.
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The other reported decision involves the New York Times Company,
publisher of the New York Times and the Boston Globe, and the National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.’s successful bid to intervene in order to modify a
protective order.229 These media entities were successful in altering a
protective order as overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.230 The
cases make for good reading but stray from the topic of the listing of patents in
the Orange Book. It is worth noting, however, that the off-label use of
Neurontin® has, unfortunately, been implicated with at least one death, a
suicide, when the drug was prescribed for the treatment of bipolar disorder.231
When rethinking the law, Congress may want to provide further guidance for
the FDA’s policy of allowing seemingly unlimited off-label uses for drugs.
Turning from this digression back to Orange Book cases, it is worth reviewing
how other Orange Book listing cases have been handled by the courts.
IV. RELIEF FOR AGGRIEVED PARTIES
The above review of recent cases might lead one to believe that there are
no remedies available to a party who believes that a patent is improperly listed
in the Orange Book. It is almost that bad. One court has recognized that “[i]n
short, [the] FDA’s position is that if the NDA holder stands on its Orange
Book listing, aggrieved parties are out of luck.”232 Essentially, the FDA has
concluded that disputes about the propriety of Orange Book listings and the
scope of listed patents are best resolved in private litigation, not by or through
the agency.233 There is, however, one regulatory tool at the aggrieved parties
disposal, that being 21 C.F.R. 314.53(f).
Food and Drug Administration regulations do provide for correction of
“patent errors.”234 This mechanism, however, is of little use. Under the
regulation, “any person” that disputes the accuracy of an Orange Book listing,
or if the failure to list a patent is questioned, that party may notify the FDA of
such disputed listing in writing.235 The FDA, in turn:
[W]ill then request of the applicable new drug application holder that the
correctness of the patent information or omission of patent information be

229. 210 F.R.D. at 257.
230. The government opposed modifying the protective order, arguing that modification that
would allow media access “would interfere with ongoing investigations.” Id. at 258 n.3. The
court, however, noted that the “action was filed in 1996 and the government [still has] not
decided whether to intervene. Molasses moves more quickly.” Id.
231. As reported by National Public Radio’s Snigdha Prakash, All Things Considered,
January 16, 2003, available at http://www.npr.org.
232. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002).
233. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent Exclusivity Provisions,
supra note 33, at 50, 348.
234. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (1998).
235. Id.
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confirmed. Unless the application holder withdraws or amends its patent
information in response to FDA’s request, the agency will not change the
patent information in the list. If the new drug application holder does not
change the patent information submitted to FDA, . . . despite any disagreement
as to the correctness of the patent information, contain an appropriate
certification for each listed patent.236

This provision has no teeth in it whatsoever. Basically, the NDA simply has to
verify its listings, an entirely self-serving opportunity with no agency
interaction. An ANDA is better off not even asking for the FDA to seek
confirmation from the NDA. The ANDA would simply give the NDA more
advance notice than in its paragraph (IV) certification. This area is ripe for the
FDA to promulgate new regulations. This lack of regulation is, however,
consistent with the FDA’s position that it will maintain a purely ministerial
role in the Orange Book listings.
To further frustrate the plight of the ANDA, it has been held that a generic
drug manufacturer has no cause of action under either the Hatch-Waxman Act
or the patent laws to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief requiring an NDA
holder to “delist” a patent improperly listed in the Orange Book.237 The
Federal Circuit, however, has suggested that a cause of action lies under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).238 In Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Biovail Corporation the Federal Circuit suggests that a generic manufacturer
could bring an APA challenge against the FDA based on the agency’s failure
to inquire into the correctness of an Orange Book listing. 239 The Fourth
Circuit decision in aaiPharma, however, seems to wholly oppose this possible
cause of action. In aaiPharma, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the FDA’s position
that its role in Orange Book listings is purely ministerial.240 The aaiPharma
decision essentially insulates and shields the FDA from an APA lawsuit based
on improper Orange Book listings.
The Purepac case, however, apparently recognizes one cause of action that
still might exist under the APA. Namely, that an ANDA could argue that a
section (viii) statement is proper and the FDA’s rejection of such statement is
arbitrary and capricious. Recall, however, that in Purepac, the ANDA holder
was not successful in preventing the FDA from allowing its competitor’s

236. Id.
237. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002); cf. Andrx
Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming Mylan, but
suggesting that a generic manufacturer could bring an APA challenge against the FDA based on
the agency’s failure to inquire into the correctness of an Orange Book listing). The Federal
Circuit’s suggestion, however, has apparently been quashed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
aaiPharma. See supra note 108, effectively closing the door on an APA challenge.
238. Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1374.
239. Id.
240. aaiPharma v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002).
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ANDA for the same generic drug. Thus, there clearly is tension between the
Fourth Circuit decision and the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of how the
APA can be used by aggrieved ANDA applicants.
V. STATUTORY IMPROVEMENTS
Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always remain
unaltered.
-Aristotle241

With the bench unequivocally holding that there is not a clearly
recognizable cause of action against an NDA who improperly lists a patent or
patents in the Orange Book, there appears to be little relief for those unjustly
stifled in their efforts to bring a generic to market. There are, however,
legislative changes in the works.
As of this writing, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with the stated intent of
providing greater access to affordable pharmaceuticals. The bill, entitled the
“Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2003,” was introduced
January 7, 2003 by Senator Susan Collins.242 In introducing the bill, Senator
Collins remarked that the bipartisan bill will make prescription drugs more
affordable and promote competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Senator
Collins noted that “[p]rescription drug spending in the United States has
increased by 92 percent over the past 5 years to almost $120 million.”243 The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that, if enacted, the amendments would
cut our Nation’s drug costs by $60 billion over the next 10 years.244 Senator
Collins noted that the bill is supported by coalitions representing the
governors, insurers, businesses, organized labor, senior groups, and individual
consumers who foot the bill for expensive drugs.245
Senator Collins again, in her introductory remarks, recognized that the
Hatch-Waxman Act now allows generics to enter the market immediately upon
expiration of “the patent” as compared to the three to five years before the
enactment of the Act. She notes, however, that “[i]f Hatch-Waxman were to
work as it was intended, consumers could expect to save between fifty and
241. BARNES & NOBLE BOOKS , THE LAWYER’S QUOTATION BOOK: A LEGAL COMPANION
(John Reay-Smith ed., 1992).
242. New Bill (S. 54) to Improve Access to Generic Drugs, Cong. Rec., S54, S54-59 (January
7, 2003), reprinted in 65 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 260 (January 17, 2003)
(hereinafter “Senator Collins”). Senator Collins (R) is senator for the state of Maine.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Not to make light of the situation, but the Patent Bar is conspicuously absent from her
list. To date and to the author’s knowledge, the American Bar Association’s Section of
Intellectual Property has not taken a position on the proposed legislation.
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sixty percent on . . . drugs as lower cost generic alternatives become available
as . . . patents expire.”246
Senator Collins further recognized that “[d]espite its past success,
however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Hatch-Waxman Act has
been subject to abuse.247 While many pharmaceutical companies have acted in
good faith, there is mounting evidence that some brand name generic drug
manufacturers have attempted to ‘game’ the system by exploiting legal
loopholes in the current law.248 Senator Collins alleges that brand-name
companies can delay a generic drug from going to market for years.249 A
‘new’ patent for an existing drug can be awarded for merely changing the color
of a pill or its packaging.250 For example, BMS delayed generic competition
on Platinol, a cancer treatment, by filing a patent on the brown bottle it came
in.251 Obviously these remarks were made on the floor of the Senate and not
by the Commissioner of Patents. Senator Collins’ remarks were, admittedly,
based on the testimony of the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
Timothy Muris, made before the Senate Commerce Commission.252 Drug
companies cannot get a continuation patent by simply “changing the color of a
pill” or claiming a “brown bottle.” This simply is not the patent law. Senator
Collins’ remarks, however, do appear targeted at certain formulation and
packaging patents that can, because of the specific scope of their claims,
potentially exclude generic drug manufacturers from entering the market. The
patents, however, may also spur innovation. Additionally, Senator Collins
references the antitrust violations associated with drugs such as Cardizem
CD®. The producer of Cardizem CD® brought patent and trademark
infringement actions against a generic manufacturer. The manufacturer
offered a settlement to pay the generic company more than $80 million in
return for keeping the generic drug off the market. Such actions, according to
Senator Collins, caused users of Cardizem CD® , which treats high blood
pressure, chest pains and heart disease, to pay $73 a month when the generic
would have cost about $32 a month. The remarks rely heavily on the FTC’s
report on the loopholes of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The proposed amendments
are fashioned to close these loopholes.
The proposed amendments appear to make major changes to the Orange
Book listing practice.253 For one, an NDA holder would be required to list,
246. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S58.
247. Id. at S54-9.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S54-9.
252. Id.
253. The major amendments occur in 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2), (c)(3), and (j)(5). The
amendments to subsection (j)(5) exclude patents that claim a process for manufacturing listed
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inter alia, the patent number, the expiration date of the patent, with respect to
each claim, if the patent claims a method use, the approved use covered by the
claim, and a declaration that the applicant, as of the date of the filing, has
provided complete and accurate patent information for all patents listed. The
introduction of these provisions forces the NDA holder to make clear how a
listed patent relates to the drug at issue and its approved uses. Conversely, an
ANDA applicant would have to file either a section (vii) paragraph (IV)
statement or a section (viii) statement with respect to each claim of a listed
patent. This would appear to close the loophole that created the Apotex and
Purepac dilemmas. In addition, it would appear to create criminal liability
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making false declarations as well.
In addition, and most importantly, the proposed legislation creates a
private right of action to challenge Orange Book patent listings. The provision
allows an ANDA applicant to file a civil action that corrects the patent
information submitted by an NDA holder by way of deleting certain patents or
seeking a declaration that the patent does not claim the approved drug or that
the patent does claim an approved use of the drug. The section does, however,
specifically preclude an award of damages.254
Other remarkable amendments include: (1) a provision that apparently bars
a patent holder from ever bringing suit against an ANDA holder if suit is not
brought within 45 days of the NDA receiving notice of the ANDA’s paragraph
(IV) certification, (2) a provision that limits the 180-day exclusivity period
awarded to first-filed ANDAs to those situations where the applicant has not
committed a “forfeiture event,”255 (3) the 180-day exclusivity period will not
be awarded if the ANDA holder is implicated in a civil suit brought against the
ANDA for patent infringement, and (4) the NDA holders are entitled to more
detailed notices from ANDAs, such as “a description of the [ANDA’s]
proposed drug substance, drug formulation, drug composition, or method of
use.”256 The bill also allocates five million dollars for implementing them and
carrying out the amendments.257
drug and patents that issue after the NDA is approved from the 30-month stay. 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5). In addition, it is the author’s interpretation that an NDA holder listing a patent issued
after the NDA is approved would be required to bring a suit, accompanied by a motion for
preliminary injunction, in order to invoke the 30-month stay.
254. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S55.
255. The forfeiture events include: (a) failure to market the generic drug, (b) withdrawal of an
application, (c) the applicant amends their certification made with respect to the Orange Book
patents, (d) failure of obtain approval of the application, (e) failure to challenge new patent
information submitted by the NDA holder, and (f) engaging in unlawful conduct. See Senator
Collins, supra note 242, at S57. This last provision, regarding unlawful conduct, is most likely
directed to settlement agreements between ANDA’s and NDA’s wherein the ANDA agrees to
refrain from entering a market to which they have a right to enter in exchange for a payment. Id.
256. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S57.
257. Id. at S57.
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Interestingly, the proposed legislation does not include two of the
recommendations proposed in the FTC Study from 2002. In particular, any
limitation on the number of 30-month stays is conspicuously absent. This
absence is likely because the NDA should be entitled to an additional 30month stay if a later-issued patent becomes a later-listed patent. If only one
30-month stay were allowed, an ANDA could receive FDA approval before
the conclusion of an infringement suit and the ANDA could, to the degree it
felt comfortable, begin marketing the generic drug while risking defeat in the
infringement action. Any limitations on the type of patents, i.e., metabolite,
product by process patents, that can be listed in the Orange Book are not
incorporated into the proposed bill as well.
The proposed legislation appears to fill many of the “loopholes” found in
the current law. The impact such legislation may have on the pharmaceutical
industry and the intellectual property law community in general is yet to be
seen. It is likely that Congress will pass some bill that addresses prescription
drug costs in light of budget constraints in government support of healthcare.
Such legislation, when ultimately enacted, will certainly spawn additional
litigation. The issues, however, should be much narrower than found in the
cases discussed herein.
So is the Hatch-Waxman Act, as it stands today, a good law? It has
definitely done much to protect the rights of innovators and to move generic
prescription drugs to market. Before its enactment, patentees were able to
extend their monopolies past the legal expiration dates of their patents. The
Act balanced the playing field between the generic drug manufacturers and the
branded manufacturers. In the future, hopefully a new balance will be struck; a
balance that clearly defines the rights of both the patentees and the generic
drug manufacturers. Only at that point will the original intention of the HatchWaxman Act be realized.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed to strike a balance between competing
interests, the rights of pioneer drug manufacturers and the consuming public.
The provisions therein have done much to meet these difficult-to-reach goals.
There are, however, two major hurdles to fully reaching the Act’s goals: (1)
improper Orange Book listings, and (2) the unrestricted practice of allowing
prescription drugs to be prescribed for “off-label” uses. The practice that has
developed with respect to Orange Book listings has created opportunities for
NDA holders, be they generic or branded drug manufacturers, to potentially
improperly expand the scope of their patents. The courts have now ruled on
the relevant statutory language, holding that there is not a cause of action for a
party aggrieved by an Orange Book listing. In order to fully realize the intent
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress must amend the laws as they exist today
to provide, inter alia, a private right of action for aggrieved parties.
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